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An Alternative Characterization of
Efficient Group Strategy-Proof Rules




In linear production economies, Maniquet and Sprumont（1999）characterized Pa-
reto-efficient and group strategy-proof rules. This paper shows an alternative charac-
terization of the rules by Pareto-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and strong non-bossi-
ness（Ritz, 1983）when the preferences are continuous, strictly monotonic, and con-
vex.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers a linear production economy in which n2 agents consumem2 divis-
ible and private goods based on a linear production function1）. In the economies, Maniquet and
Sprumont（1999）characterized Pareto-efficient and group strategy-proof rules. A rule is a func-
tion which associates a feasible allocation with a profile of agents’ preferences2）. Group strategy-
proofness, which is an incentive property of rules, requires that any group of agents cannot
gain by jointly untruthful preference revelations. Pareto-efficiency, which is an efficiency
＊This paper is a product of research which was financially supported by a designated research project
of the Research Institute, Momoyama Gakuin University,（20192020）“A Study on Bounded Rationality
in Game Theory” and JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP19K13661. Any errors in this paper are entirely
the responsibility of the author.
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TEL: +81 725 54 3131（main phone number）. FAX: +81 725 54 3202. E-mail : ka-nishi@andrew.ac.jp
‡Research Institute for Socionetwork Strategies, Kansai University, 3335, Yamate, Suita, Osaka, 564
8680, Japan. TEL: +81 6 6368 1228. FAX: +81 6 6330 3304.
1）See Moulin and Shenker（1992）, Shenker（1992）, Maniquet and Sprumont（1999）, Leroux（2004）,
Kumar（2013）, and Nishizaki（2018b）for the studies on production economies. Especially, Maniquet
and Sprumont（1999）and Nishizaki（2018b）studied linear production economies.
2）In this paper, a rule is defied as a direct revelation mechanism associated with a social choice function.
This means that a rule is equivalent to a social choice function.
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property of rules, requires that there is no allocation leading to a Pareto improvement for
agents. This paper shows an alternative characterization of Maniquet and Sprumont’s（1999）
rules by Pareto-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and strong non-bossiness（Ritz, 1983）. Strategy-
proofness, which is in general weaker than group strategy-proofness, requires that truthful
preference revelation is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent. Strong non-bossiness,
which is in general stronger than non-bossiness（Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981）, re-
quires that each agent cannot change the allocation by the agent’s preference revelation while
maintaining the agent’s utility3）. As byproduct of the alternative characterization, this paper also
shows that the combination of strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness is equivalent to
group strategy-proofness under Pareto-efficient rules in the model presented here4）.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model pre-
sented here and Section 3 the properties of rules. Section 4 demonstrates the results and Sec-
tion 5 concludes this paper.
2 Model
Similar to Maniquet and Sprumont（1999）and Nishizaki（2018b）, this paper considers a lin-
ear production economy with n2 agents and m2 divisible and private goods. Let I≡{1, . . . ,
n} be the set of agents and K≡{1, . . . , m} be the set of goods. For each i∈I and each k∈
K, let yik∈ +≡{r∈ |r0} be consumption of good k for agent i and yi≡（yik）k∈K∈ m+ be
consumption for agent i. Let y≡（yi）i∈I mn+ be an allocation. In the model presented here,
a good is produced from other goods according to a technology which exhibits constant return
to scale. For simplicity, let Y≡{y∈ mn+ |∑i∈I∑k∈K yik1} be the set of feasible allocations.
A preference for an agent is represented by a binary relation defined on m+. For each i∈I,
let Ri be a preference for agent i and Ii be the indifference associated with Ri. This paper as-
sumes that each preference is continuous, strictly monotonic（that is, strictly increasing in con-
sumption of each good）, and convex. For each i∈I, let i be the set of such preferences for
agent i. Let R≡（Ri）i∈I be a profile of preferences and ≡Ði∈I i be the set of profiles of pref-
erences. For each i∈I, let R-i≡（Rh）h∈I\{i} be a profile of preferences other than agent i and
-i≡Ðh∈I\{i} h be the set of profiles of preferences other than agent i. In addition, for each
i, j∈I, let R-i, j≡（Rh）h∈I\{i, j} be a profile of preferences other than agents i and j.
3）Strong non-bossiness was called non-corruptibility by Ritz（1983）. See Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato
（2007）, Berga and Moreno（2009）, and Nishizaki（2012, 2014, 2018a）for the studies on strong non-
bossiness.
4）Non-bossiness is necessary for group strategy-proofness in some environments ; for example, non-ex-
cludable public good economies（Serizawa, 1994）, pure exchange economies（Barberà and Jackson,
1995）, the problems of cost sharing（Mutuswami, 2005）, and the problems of allocating indivisible goods
without monetary transfers（Pápai, 2000 ; Takamiya, 2001）.
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Remark 1. Maniquet and Sprumont（1999）imposed continuity, strict monotonicity, and some
richness conditions which convexity satisfies5）. Nishizaki（2018b）imposed “strict” convexity in
addition to continuity and strict monotonicity6）.
Agents collectively choose a feasible allocation according to a rule. Let f : → Y be a rule
which associates a feasible allocation y∈Y with a profile of preferences R∈ . For each R∈
and each i∈I, let fi（R）be the consumption for agent i at the allocation f（R）.
3 Properties of Rules
This paper studies Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and strongly non-bossy rules in the above
model. Pareto-efficiency requires that there is no allocation leading to a Pareto improvement
for agents. Strategy-proofness requires that truthful preference revelation is a weakly dominant
strategy for each agent. Strong non-bossiness（Ritz, 1983）, which is in general stronger than
non-bossiness（Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981）, requires that each agent cannot change
the allocation by the agent’s preference revelation while maintaining the agent’s utility7）.
Definition 1. The rule f satisfies Pareto-efficiency if and only if for each R∈ and each y
∈Y, if yiRi fi（R）for each i∈I, then yi Ii fi（R）for each i∈I.
Definition 2. The rule f satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if for each R, R′∈ and each
i∈I, fi（Ri , R′-i）Rifi（R′i , R′-i）.
Definition 3. The rule f satisfies strong non-bossiness if and only if for each R, R′∈ and
each i∈I, if fi（Ri , R′-i）Ii fi（R′i, R′-i）, then f（Ri , R′-i）=f（R′i , R′-i）.
4 Results
For each i∈I and each r∈ +, let Bi（r）≡{yi∈ m+|∑k∈K yikr} be the consumption set for
agent i at r. For each i∈I, each Ri∈ i , and each r∈ +, let
m（Ri , Bi（r））≡{yi∈Bi（r）|yiRiy′i for each y′i∈Bi（r）}
be the set of most preferred consumption for agent i with Ri in the agent’s consumption set
Bi（r）. Similar to Maniquet and Sprumont（1999）and Nishizaki（2018b）, we use the notation
5）The richness conditions are called Assumptions（A1）and（A2）by Maniquet and Sprumont（1999）.
6）Strict convexity satisfies Assumption（A1）, but not（A2）introduced by Maniquet and Sprumont
（1999）, as stated by them.
7）The rule f satisfies non-bossiness if and only if for each R, R′∈ and each i∈I, if fi（Ri , R′-i）
=fi（R′i , R′-i）, then f（Ri , R′-i）=f（R′i , R′-i）.
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m（Ri , r）as substitute for m（Ri , Bi（r））for each i∈I, each Ri∈ i , and each r∈ +.
Remark 2. The set of most preferred consumption might not be a singleton because the pref-
erences are convex, not “strictly” convex.
In the model presented here, Maniquet and Sprumont（1999, Lemma 2）showed a feature
of Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof rules.
Lemma 1（Maniquet and Sprumont, 1999）. If the rule f satisfies Pareto-efficiency and strategy
-proofness, then for each i∈I, there is ai : -i → + such that fi（Ri , R-i）∈m（Ri , ai（R-i））for
each R∈ 8）.
Remark 3. For Lemma 1, we know that ∑i∈I ai（R-i）=1 for each R∈ by the feasibility of
allocations and Pareto-efficiency.
Remark 4. For each R, R′∈ and each i∈I, Lemma 1 implies that ai（R-i）=ai（R′-i）if fi（Ri ,
R-i）=fi（Ri , R′-i）because the preferences are strictly monotonic.
In what follows, we focus on Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof rules stated in Lemma 1. Un-
der such rules, the combination of strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness requires that
the set of most preferred consumption is a singleton.
Lemma 2. Suppose that for each i∈I, there is ai : -i → + such that fi（Ri , R-i）∈m（Ri , ai
（R-i））for each R∈ . If the rule f satisfies strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness, then for
each R∈ and each i∈I, m（Ri , ai（R-i））is a singleton.
Proof. To the contrary, we suppose that there are R∈ and i∈I such that m（Ri , ai（R-i））is
not a singleton. By supposition, we know that fi（Ri , R-i）∈m（Ri , ai（R-i））. These imply that
there is R′i∈ i such that fi（R′i , R-i）∈m（Ri , ai（R-i））and
fi（R′i , R-i）=| fi（Ri , R-i）.
Because the preferences are convex, we can take Ri″∈ i such that
fi（R′i , R-i）, fi（Ri , R-i）∈m（R″i , ai（R-i））and fi（R′i , R-i）I″i fi（Ri , R-i）.
Together with strategy-proofness, this implies that fi(R″i , R-i)I″i fi（R′i , R-i）. Together with
strong non-bossiness, this implies f（R″i , R-i）=f（R′i , R-i）. Similarly, we find that f（Ri″, R-i）
=f（Ri , R-i）. These imply that f（R′i , R-i）=f（Ri , R-i）, that is, fi（R′i , R-i）= fi（Ri , R-i）and we
have a contradiction. □
8）Note that the set of continuous, strictly monotonic, and convex preferences satisfies Assumption（A1）
introduced by Maniquet and Sprumont（1999）, as stated by them.
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Remark 5. If the preferences are strictly convex, then the set of most preferred consumption
is a singleton irrespective of imposing strong non-bossiness9）.
In addition, the combination of strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness requires that the
set of most preferred consumption is uniquely determined according the value of ai（R-i）stated
in Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. Suppose that for each i∈I, there is ai : -i → + such that fi（Ri , R-i）∈m（Ri , ai
（R-i））for each R∈ . If the rule f satisfies strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness, then for
each R, R′∈ and each i∈I, m（R′i , ai（R-i））=m（Ri , ai（R-i））.
Proof. To the contrary, we suppose that there are R, R′∈ and i∈I such that m（R′i , ai（R-i））
=| m（Ri , ai（R-i））. By supposition, we know that fi（R′i , R-i）∈m（R′i , ai（R-i））and fi（Ri , R-i）
∈m（Ri , ai（R-i））. Together with Lemma 2, these imply that fi（R′i , R-i）=| fi（Ri , R-i）. Because
the preferences are convex, we can take Ri″∈ i such that fi（R′i , R-i）, fi（Ri , R-i）∈m（Ri′′, ai
（R-i））and fi（R′i , R-i）I″i fi（Ri , R-i）. By an argument similar to Lemma 2, we have a contradic-
tion. □
Remark 6. If the preferences are strictly convex, then Lemma 3 does not hold because we can-
not take Ri″ stated in the proof of Lemma 3.
Remark 7. Lemma 3 can be rewritten as follows : if the rule f satisfies Pareto-efficiency,
strategy-proofness, and strong non-bossiness, then for each R, R′∈ and each i∈I, fi（R′i ,
R-i）=fi（Ri , R-i）.
Based on the above results, this paper shows an alternative characterization of “unequal”
budget free choice rules（Maniquet and Sprumont, 1999）10）.
Theorem. The rule f satisfies Pareto-efficiency, strategy-proofness , and strong non-bossiness if
and only if there is（ái）i∈I∈ n+ such that for each i∈I, fi（Ri , R-i）∈m（Ri , ái）for each R∈ ,
where ∑i∈I ái=1.
Proof. Because the “if” part is straightforward, we only confirm the “only if” part. Let i∈I. By
Lemma 1, we know that there is ai : -i → + such that fi（Ri , R-i）∈m（Ri , ai（R-i））for each
R∈ . Due to Remark 3, we also know that ∑i∈I ai（R-i）=1 for each R∈ . Let R∈ . Simi-
9）This implies that strong non-bossiness is equivalent to non-bossiness used by Nishizaki（2018b）under
Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof rules when the preferences are continuous, strictly monotonic, and
strictly convex.
10）Maniquet and Sprumont（1999）introduced the equal budget free choice rule under which ái=1/n for
each i∈I in the theorem.
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lar to Maniquet and Sprumont（1999, Theorem 3）, this proof only shows that
ai（R′j , R-i, j）= ai（Rj , R-i, j）for each j∈I\{i} and each R′j∈ j .
Let j∈I\{i} and R′j∈ j . Due to Remark 7, we know that fj（R′j , R-j）=fj（Rj , R-j）. Together
with strong non-bossiness, this implies that f（R′j , R-j）=f（Rj , R-j）, that is, fi（Ri , R′j , R-i, j）
=fi（Ri , Rj , R-i, j）. Due to Remark 4, this means that ai（R′j , R-i, j）=ai（Rj , R-i, j）. □
Based on the above theorem and the result of Maniquet and Sprumont（1999, Theorem 3）,
we have the following corollary11）.
Corollary. When the rule f satisfies Pareto-efficiency, f satisfies strategy-proofness and strong non
-bossiness if and only if f satisfies group strategy-proofness12）.
5 Conclusion
The above theorem crucially depends on convexity of preferences in addition to continuity
and strict monotonicity due to Remark 6. In fact, Maniquet and Sprumont（1999）showed an
example of Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and strongly non-bossy rules which has non-con-
stant ai for each i∈I when convexity is replaced by strict convexity13）. In the case of strictly con-
vex preferences, a characterization of Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and strongly non-bossy
rules is an open question.
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